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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  06-4550
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                 Appellee
v.
FREDERICK RATLIFF
                                   Appellant 
____________
On Appeal from United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.: 05-cr-0463
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 25, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 1, 2007 )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
A grand jury indicted Appellant Frederick Ratliff on two counts of sexual
exploitation of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) and 2252A(a)(5)(B). 
2In full satisfaction of the original charges, Ratliff signed a plea agreement and pleaded
guilty to a superseding information charging him with receipt of obscene material in
commerce through an interactive computer service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462,
which carries a statutory maximum penalty of five years imprisonment.
The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated Ratliff’s adjusted Guidelines
range at 121 to 151 months imprisonment, but Guideline § 5G1.1(a) provides for
application of the statutory maximum, in this case 60 months, when it is lower.  As part of
his written objections to the PSR, Ratliff argued that he should receive a downward
departure based on extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation, which we recognized as a
permissible ground for departure in United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1997). 
During the sentencing proceeding, Ratliff testified and called witnesses in support of his
argument.  After hearing the testimony, the District Court adopted the PSR without
change, declined to depart downward from the advisory Guidelines sentence, and
sentenced Ratliff to 60 months imprisonment.
Ratliff appeals his sentence on two grounds:  the District Court (1) failed to
“formally rule on” Ratliff’s motion for a downward departure, United States v. Gunter,
462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal brackets omitted); and (2) failed to give
“meaningful consideration to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors,” United States v. Cooper,
437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a).
3We reject the first assignment of error because the District Court expressly
acknowledged on the record that Ratliff was “asking that the Court would consider a
downward departure or a variance . . . based on the defendant’s extraordinary efforts at
rehabilitation.”  The District Court went on to conclude that the “Guideline sentence is
appropriate in this case” after listening to the testimony and argument of counsel. 
Although the exact words “I deny the defendant’s motion to depart downward” would
have made for a clearer record, our holding in Gunter does not require them.  See United
States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 2006) (inferring that departure motion
was denied despite absence of explicit ruling to that effect); see also United States v.
Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006) (“we will not elevate form over substance”). 
Here, the District Court’s imposition of the Guidelines sentence following its express
recognition of its authority to depart therefrom is ample evidence that the District Court
denied Ratliff’s motion for downward departure.
We also reject Ratliff’s second argument because the District Court provided a
sufficient explanation for its sentence.  In Cooper, we held that “[t]he court need not
discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.”  437
F.3d at 329.  Here, even assuming that it had any merit, the only argument Ratliff made to
warrant a downward variance under § 3553(a) is that he engaged in exceptional post-
offense rehabilitative efforts.  In discussing this argument, the District Court stated:  “I’m
giving the defendant credit for acceptance of responsibility, although I have expressed
some reservations about whether or not he’s come clean with respect to how the images
4came to be on his computer.  I think he is legally entitled to that credit.”  Indeed, Ratliff
received credit for acceptance of responsibility in the form of a three-level reduction from
his adjusted offense level pursuant to Guidelines § 3E1.1.  But the District Court declined
to vary downward from the Guidelines sentence by stating:  “There might be . . . a
marginal acceptance of responsibility that would warrant the defendant getting that credit,
but I think for me to even seriously consider what you’re asking here, I need to be
completely confident that the defendant has owned up to his behavior here.”  Therefore,
in reaching its ultimate conclusion that the “Guideline sentence is appropriate in this
case,” the District Court gave meaningful consideration to the argument for downward
variance advanced by Ratliff.
Moreover, even with respect to § 3553(a) factors under which Ratliff made no
argument for downward variance, the District Court stated:
I’ve considered the factors set forth in 3553(a), especially looking at the
defendant’s age, his health, his background, including his history of
childhood abuse, his mental health, his rehabilitative efforts, the need for
punishment, for rehabilitation, and for a sentence that would reflect the
seriousness of his conduct and suggest some balance of all of the sentencing
goals.
Although an ideal explanation by the District Court would tie each of these considerations
to specific facts of record, the explanation given satisfies what the law requires.  See
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 (“[n]or must a court discuss and make findings as to each of the
§ 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in
sentencing”).
5Ratliff does not argue that the District Court improperly calculated his adjusted
Guidelines range (121 to 151 months) or ultimate Guidelines sentence (60 months), or
that the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable.  Having concluded that
Ratliff’s arguments are without merit, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
